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Comment
The Clash Between the First Amendment
and Civil Rights:
Public University Nondiscrimination
Clauses
I. INTRODUCTION
Individual rights have become increasingly important in this country in
the past few decades. Beginning with the 1960s Civil Rights movement,
protests and activism have been the impetus for enacting laws which allow the
government to coerce private persons to respect, in some instances passively
accept, the rights, viewpoints, and actions of those around us. University
campuses across the country form part of the current bedrock of this
movement.
Therefore, it should come as no surprise that public universities,' the
closest representative of the government to college students, are the subject of
much of the pressure to enact rules protecting the rights, viewpoints, and
actions of minority members of society.
The addition of the
nondiscrimination agreement as a precondition to recognition as a university
student group is part of the outgrowth of this pressure.2
Universities originally intended that nondiscrimination clauses ensure
student groups recognized by the university did not exercise improper
prejudices based on gender, nationality, or religious belief. Recently,
however, the gay rights movement has placed intense pressure on universities
to include sexual orientation on the list of protected classes. Minority student
groups composed of homosexuals and bisexuals have sought protection on

1. "University" is used to denote any publicly funded institution of higher
education which could be classified as a state actor for constitutional analysis.
2. E.g., every registered student organization must agree "to provide equal

opportunity regardless of race, sex, handicap, sexual orientation or other irrelevant
criteria when determining its membership, or who may hold offices within the RSO."

See Memorandum from Central Michigan University at 1 (Nov. 17,1993) (on file with
authors). The University ofMissourirequires a nondiscrimination clause to be inserted

in a group's constitution and bylaws, as well as a statement that the group will not
discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation in regards to membership and voting
rights. See Organization RegistrationPapers for University of Missouri-Columbia (on
file with authors).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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university campuses (and in society as a whole)3 from discrimination based
on sexual orientation.

While many universities have added sexual orientation to the list of
protected classes covered by the nondiscrimination clause, many student
groups have felt that the amended nondiscrimination clause violates their
constitutional rights
The constitutional issues invoked in this debate are
especially contentious to student religious organizations and other
organizations with religious, moral or ethical beliefs against homosexual
conduct.' The ultimate question is which of the conflicting civil liberties
existing in this context will trump the other.

3. See, e.g., Arthur H. Matthews, They Still Don't GetIt, WORLD, April 23, 1994,
at 24 (concerning high school religious organization required to permit nonbelievers
to lead the group in order to exist) and the resulting lawsuit, Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free
Sch. Dist., 876 F. Supp. 445 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) (denying preliminary injunction
prohibiting school from forbidding religious group to exist at school without signing
nondiscrimination policy); R. Lamont Jones Jr., FiredDorm Assistant, CMU Settle
Rights Suit, PrrTsBuRGH PosT-GAzFTTE, June 10, 1994, at C4 (Carnegie Mellon
University student fired from job for refusing to wear gay rights button which violated
his religious beliefs).
4. The constitutionality of adding sexual orientation to the list of protected classes
has been questioned on numerous university campuses by student religious groups, see
infra note 17, and Stephen M. Bainbridge, Student Religious Organizations and
University Policies Against Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation:
Implicationsof the Religious FreedomRestorationAct, 21 J.C. & U.L. 369 (1994).
5. As an example, Christian organizations rely on eighteen Bible verses
condemning homosexual conduct, see, e.g., Romans 1:25-27:
They exchanged the truth of God for a lie, and worshipped and served created
things rather than the Creator-who is forever praised. Amen. Because of this,
God gave them over to shameful lusts. Even their women exchanged natural
relations for unnatural ones. In the same way the men also abandoned natural
relations with women and were inflamed with lust for one another. Men
committed indecent acts with other men, and received in themselves the due
penalty for their perversion.
Other groups might not have a moral objection to sexual orientation becoming
a protected class, but instead feel that such an addition would be overly intrusive and
result in excessive regulation by the state.
A muslim student also found homosexuality objectionable to his religious beliefs
and accordingly refused to pay the part of his tuition bill which was allotted to
homosexual groups. Muslim Calls Student Levy for Gays A Sin, CHICAGO TRIBTNE,
Nov. 27, 1994 at C15.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/4
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II. FRAmwG THE ISSUE

No federal law presently bans discrimination based on homosexuality,
gender preference, or sexual orientation. A growing number of states and
municipalities, however, do ban discrimination onthese grounds. Religious
organizations may be specifically exempted from these laws, or exemptions
may be limited to clergy. When there are no exemptions, reported cases
have upheld the First Amendment right of churches to discriminate on these
grounds.7 The full scope of a religious organization's right to discriminate
on the basis of homosexuality remains to be explored.'
The purpose of this comment will be to explore the right of university
religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation. Or,
more to the point, to not be compelled by the university, as a prerequisite for
university recognition, to promise not to discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation.
A. Federaland State NondiscriminationClauses
No federal laws currently preclude discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.9 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 typifies Congress' approach to

nondiscrimination clauses. It states in part: "No person in the United States
shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."1 The

Civil Rights Act exempts religious organizations from its anti-discrimination
statute as applied to a staff member who occupies a leadership role."

6. (footnote omitted). See infra note 12 for a list of state laws banning
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
7. Madsenv. Erwin, 481 N.E.2d 1160 (Mass. 1985) (upheld discharge of lesbian
employee from the ChristianScienceMonitor,which is treated as part of the Christian
Science church); Walker v. First Presbyterian Church, 22 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 762
(1980) (dismissal of unrepentant homosexual organist upheld despite San Francisco
ordinance); Murphy v. Buchanan, 21 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 696 (1979) (pastor's
withdrawal of employment offer after learning applicant was homosexual upheld
despite St. Paul, Minnesota, ordinance).
8. RicHARD B. CousER, MoTsRY AND THE AMEmRcAN LEGAL SYSTEM 114
(1993).
9. Id.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1988).
11. § 702 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988
& Supp. V 1993). This exemption was upheld by the Supreme Court in Corporation
of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 329 (1987). The Elliott-Larsen Civil
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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However, states are increasingly
enacting laws prohibiting discrimination on
12
the basis of sexual orientation.
B. Recognition for University Student Organizations
For student organizations desiring to be active on university campuses,
gaining the status of a "Recognized Student Organization"' 3 is a vital first
step. In the past, this has typically involved signing an agreement not to
discriminate on the usual suspect classifications: race; national origin; sex;
handicap; and religion.
Gaining official recognition is vital for several reasons. First, only
recognized student organizations may compete for funds allocated to student
groups from a tax imposed on all students.14 Second, and far more important
than money, recognition confers the right to meet on campus, reserve meeting
rooms, use the university's computers, purchase goods through the university
purchasing office, and advertise the group and/or its message in designated
areas.1
Furthermore, without recognition, a group may not sponsor
fundraisers on campus without paying for its use of student facilities and
classrooms. The group is also unable to obtain free office space on
campus. 6
In essence, the university holds the tickets to the "marketplace of ideas"
on university campuses. Without a ticket, access to the market is barred. In

Rights Act provides the same exemption for religious organizations. MICH. Con.
LAws §§ 31.2101 - .2804 (West Supp. 1995). These exemptions seem to be required
by the First Amendment. See King's Garden, Inc. v. FCC, 498 F.2d 51, 56 (D.C. Cir.
1974).
12. See CAL. Civ. CoDE § 51.7 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. LABoR CODE § 1102.1
(West Supp. 1995); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-81r (West Supp. 1995); HAW.
REv. STAT. §§ 378-1, 378-3 (Supp. 1992); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 151B §§ 3,
4 (West Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363 (West Supp. 1995); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 10:5-5, 10:5-12 (West 1993); VT. STAr. ANN. tit. 1, § 143 (Supp. 1994) and tit. 9,
§§ 4503-4504 (1993) and tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.22,
111.32 (West 1988). See also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2502, 1-2503 (1992).
13. "Recognized Student Organization" is the term used at the University of
Missouri-Columbia and will be used throughout this comment. The University of
Illinois also uses this terminology. See Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 370. Other
schools may use different, though similar terminology. See, e.g., Rosenberger v.
Curators and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2514 (1995),
where such groups are called "Contracted Independent Organizations."
14. Rosenberger,115 S.Ct. at 2514-15.
15. Id. at 2518-20.
16. M-BooK 1995-96, RuLrs AND REGuLATIONS

OF Tm

UNriV

MISSoURI, Student Organizations,16, 20 (1995) [hereinafter "M-BooK"].
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/4
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the past, ticket prices have been relatively low. The university has merely
required the group to agree to a set of principles governing orderly conduct,
established membership and leadership requirements, and a proviso that the
group will not discriminate on the basis of suspect or quasi-suspect classes.
Now, the university seeks to raise the admission price to its marketplace of
ideas-essentially asking some groups to sell their souls-by adding sexual
orientation to the list of protected classes. This addition results in moral,
ethical and religious dilemmas for many student organizations, mostly
religious groups, who believe either that the university has no right to dictate
the validity of certain viewpoints, or find homosexual conduct contrary to the
group's religious scruples.
C. Past and CurrentDisputes
Religious groups from at least eleven universities (not including the
University of Missouri) have experienced difficulty in gaining either
recognition or funding based on nondiscrimination policies. 7 Possibly the
first such dispute between a university and a religious student organization
occurred at the University of Washington."8 The University of Washington
denied the application of Campus Crusade for Christ to obtain registered
student organization status. 9 The dispute escalated as the university brought
in the state attorney general's office and Campus Crusade retained a private
law firm.2" Fortunately, the two sides were able to agree that the United
States Constitution mandated a religious exemption and the university granted
Campus Crusade registered student organization status.
The University of Missouri-Columbia has established a Student
Organizations, Governments and Activities (SOGA) committee to determine
whether a student organization should receive official recognition." SOGA
has established a recognition report that every student organization must sign
and a clause that the organization must insert into its constitution that states

17. See Memorandum from Christian Legal Society (May 5, 1994) (on file with
the authors) (identifying the University of Washington, Central Michigan University,
StetsonUniversity, University of Florida, University of Minnesota, University of North
Carolina-Chapel Hill, University of New Mexico, SUNY-Buffalo, University of
Illinois, University of West Virginia, and the University of Michigan as campuses

where such disputes have arisen).
18. See Letter from Steven McFarland, Attorney for Campus Crusade for Christ,
to Carol S. Niccolls, AssistantAttorney General of Washington (Nov. 5, 1991) (on file

with the authors).
19. McFarland, supra note 18, at 1.
20. McFarland, supranote 18, at 1.
21. M-BoOK, supranote 16, at 17.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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the group will not deny membership on the basis of "race, religion, color, age,
sex, national origin, disability, Vietnam veteran era status and sexual
22 If a group refuses to sign this statement, the "organization
orientation."
does not officially exist on campus."'
A Mormon student organization at the University of Missouri, the
National Latter-Day Saints Students Association, previously recognized
before the university added sexual orientation to the list, refused to sign the
amended statement which included sexual orientation.24 As a result, the
university denied official recognition to the organization.' A resolution of
this dispute, if any, has not been made public.
At the University of Illinois in 1993, the Christian Legal Society sought
university recognition but refused to sign a statement including sexual
orientation as a protected class.26 After the University denied recognition,
they began discussions with the university administration.2" After the
exchange of several memorandums and letters and the intervention of the
National Christian Legal Society, the University of Illinois granted religious
groups an exemption.'
At Central Michigan University in 1993, Intervarsity Christian Fellowship
and other Christian organizations asked for a religious exemption from the
addition of sexual orientation to the nondiscrimination clause.29 The
university initially denied this request and informed them that to be
recognized, they must provide equal opportunity to homosexuals, despite the
fact that this contravened the religious tenets of the local and national
organization.3" After several months of debate and research by the university
and the Christian groups, the President of the university issued a statement, 1

22. See, Deborah Haar, SOGA Stands by Policy of Non-discrimination, TBE
1994, at 1 (emphasis added).
23. Haar, supra note 22, at 4.
24. Haar, supra note 22, at 4. See also Justin Giles, Group Might Lose
OrganizationStatus, THE MANEATER, May 3, 1994, at 3.
25. Haar, supra note 22, at 4.
26. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 369-70.
27. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 369-70.
28. Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 404. A similar dispute arose at the University
of Michigan and the law school chapter of Christian Legal Society. A similar
exemption was granted. See Memorandum from the Center for Law and Religious
MA EATR, Nov. 22,

Freedom to Deane Baker, Regent of the University of Michigan (Sept. 22, 1993) (on

file with the authors).
29. See Memorandum of Central Michigan University, supra note 2, at 1-5
(describing the factual and legal contentions of both sides).

30. See Memorandum of Central Michigan University, supra note 2, at 2.
31. Leonard E. Plachta, President of Central Michigan University, Statement on
the Exemption of ChristianRegistered Student Organizationsfrom the University's

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/4
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concluding, based on legal advice from the university's attorneys, that the
university could not constitutionally force Christian organizations to comply
with the sexual orientation proviso in the selection of its membership or
leadership.32 However, the exemption did not extend to the right to attend
the meetings.33 If they had open meetings, sexual orientation could not be
a basis for exclusion.34 Presumably, the organizations accepted this
limitation.
In every one of these disputes,35 the university has retreated once it
discovered the constitutional law encompassing this arena.36 None of these
cases have proceeded to court; thus no courts have ruled definitively on this
sensitive issue.
III. FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Nondiscrimination clauses implicate freedom of speech issues when
persons must make a statement in order to receive the government benefit of
student funds. These clauses force the student religious group to make an
implicit (if not explicit) statement that no moral distinction exists between
homosexual and religious lifestyles and activities. Although physical
compulsion is absent, this comment will show that such university action
constitutes a violation of the First Amendment rights of student religious
groups.
The primary benefit of university recognition is access to facilities and
funds. Student religious organizations have no right to subsidies from a public
university for speech activities.37 The Supreme Court has held that a state,
like any private owner of property, may preserve its funds and facilities for
their dedicated use and may decline to lend them for other purposes.3 8

Non-DiscriminationPolicy (Nov. 18, 1993) (on file with the authors).
32. See Plachta, supra note 31, at 2.
33. See Plachta, supranote 31, at 2.
34. See Plachta, supranote 31, at 2.

35. With the possible exception of the University of Missouri dispute which
appears to be at a mutual standstill.
36. See also NATIONAL & INTERNATIONAL RELIGION REPORT, Vol. 8, No. 16 at

7 (Catholic student at Carnegie-Mellon University settles lawsuit againstuniversity out
of court after being fired from his job as a residential assistant for refusing to wear a
button supporting the homosexual rights movement. The dean of student affairs
commented that it was "not appropriate that anybody be asked to declare a belief he
doesn't hold.").
37. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 182 n.8 (1972).
38. Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct. 2141,
2146 (1993).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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However, once the university has dedicated the property for speech purposes,
First Amendment guarantees attach due to the university's status as a state
actor." This rule applies whether the State has provided access to facilities
or monetary funds. 40 Although some courts attempted to draw a distinction
between funds and facilities, 41 clearly no distinction exists for First
Amendment purposes. In Rosenbergerv. Rector and Visitors of University of
Virginia, the Supreme Court held that this distinction is clearly wrong.42 The
government cannot discriminate among private speakers on the economic basis
of scarcity of resources. 4' Because "[t]here is no difference in logic or
principle, and no difference of constitutional significance, between a school
using its funds to operate a facility to which students have access, and 44
a
school paying a third-party contractor to operate the facility on its behalf,"
a university may not engage in impermissible discrimination against speech
based on a distinction between facilities and funding.
First Amendment analysis is predicated on so-called forum analysis.46
The three types of fora are traditional public fora, designated public fora, and
limited public fora.47 In traditional public fora (for example, sidewalks and
public parks), the governmentmay make exclusions through regulations based
on subject matter or speaker identity only when required by a compelling state
interest and the regulations are narrowly drawn to achieve that end.48
Designated public fora (for example, school buildings after school hours)
occur where the government opens up property not traditionally dedicated to
speech activity for a wide variety of speech purposes which subjects the
property to the same constitutional limitations as traditional public fora.49
Finally, limited public fora occur where the government allows its property to
remain "non-public except as to specified uses."5' With respect to limited

39. Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510,
2516-17 (1995).
40. Id. at 2519.
41. SeeRosenbergerv. Rector and Visitor's of the University of Virginia, 18 F.3d
269, 285 (4th Cir. 1994) for the Fourth Circuit's treatment of this issue. See also infra
notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
42. Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2519.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2523.

45. Id. at 2524.
46. See Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 113 S. Ct.
2141 (1993); Perry Educ. Ass'nv. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
47. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S.Ct. at 2142.
48. Id. at 2146.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 2145.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/4
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public forum, control over access can be based on subject matter and speaker
of the
identity "so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable
51 in light
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral."
There has been considerable litigation between student organizations and
universities to determine whether to designate student funds as public fora or
limited public fora. Student organizations attempt to show that the university
has made funds available for broad communicativepurposes while universities
try to show other purposes behind the availability of funds for student
organizations. Courts have decided this issue both ways.
In Healy v. James,52 the United States Supreme Court held that a public
university's refusal to recognize a student chapter of Students for a
Democratic Society ("SDS")53 violated the students' First Amendment rights
to contribute to the "intellectual give and take of campus debate."54 The
Court noted that the "practical realities" of the situation could not be ignored
in evaluating the group's constitutional rights.55 Thus, the Court ruled the
university must support SDS speech according to the same guidelines which

provided other organizations support for expressive activities.56

Joyner v. Whiting 1 reached the same decision with regard to a
university newspaper at North Carolina Central University, a predominantly
black school. The editorial staff printed several articles adamantly proposing
that whites not be allowed to enroll to preserve the "university's mission" of
The university president withdrew financial
educating young blacks.5
support as a result of these editorials.59 Even though the comments
"advocated racial segregation contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964," the Fourth Circuit, citing Healy, held that the
university could not censor the student publication by any means6" unless the

51. Id. at 2147.
52. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
53. According to the university, SDS promoted violence as an acceptable means
of social change. Id. at 176.
54. Id. at 181.
55. Id. at 183.
56. Id. at 183-84.
57. 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir. 1973).
58. Id. at 458.
59. Id. at 459.
60. These included "suspending the editors, suppressing circulation, requiring
imprimatur of controversial articles, excisingrepugnantmaterial,withdrawingfmancial
support," or "any other form of censorial oversight based on the institution's power of
the purse." Id. at 460 nn.2-8.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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student speech was forbidden due to a danger of physical violence 6 or
disruption at the university.62
Conversely, Tipton v. University of Hawaii63 held that the availability
of funds to student organizations did not constitute the designation of a public
forum.'
Tipton relied heavily on Rust v. Sullivan65 which states, "[t]he
Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively fund a
program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public interest,
without at the same time funding an alternate program which seeks to deal
with the problem in another way."' Tipton accepted the university's denial
of funding to student groups "which would use the funds to promote a
particular religious point of view, even if in a secular context" because the
availability of funds was designed to "encourage student participation in cocurricular activities."'6 The court added that simply because the university
could have selected different funding criteria did not invalidate the actual
funding program the university adopted.68
The Tipton opinion addressed several other issues in dicta. First, once
a university adopts a funding policy for extracurricular activities, it must apply
the policy uniformly to all qualified applicants.69 Decisions denying funding
for an expressive purpose based on the nature of an applicant rather than the
policy are subjected to the heightened scrutiny test."° Second, because Tipton
dealt with a facial challenge to the policy, the court expressly declined to
decide whether a university could refuse to fund all student religious
organizations while funding the activities of other groups.7 Of course, this
is the issue presented in specific instances where universities coerce student
religious groups into making statements in university "nondiscrimination"
clauses.

61. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (forbidding advocacy which
"is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action").

62. See Tinker v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(limiting free and unrestricted expression in schools to instances where it does not

"materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline
in the operation of the school").
63. 15 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 1994).
64. Id. at 926.
65. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
66. Id. at 193.
67. Tipton, 15 F.3d at 924, 926.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 927.
70. Id.
71. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/4
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Despite the torrent of litigation in classifying school policy as a
designated public forum or limited public forum, religious student groups need
not rely on forum analysis to prevail before the courts. Religious groups
prevailed before the Supreme Court in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches
Union Free School Districtwhere the Court stated that even if the regulations
constituted a limited forum, the group was entitled to use school facilities. 2
In Lamb 's Chapel, a religious group attempted to use school facilities to
show a series of films discussing traditional Christian family values.73 The
New York school district permitted use of facilities by public groups for social
or civic purposes so long as they followed promulgated regulations from the
state.74 Rule 7 of the school district's rules explicitly proscribed using school
facilities for religious purposes, and on this basis the school district denied use
to Lamb's Chapel.75 Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals
upheld the denial of benefits to Lamb's Chapel on the basis that the state had
created a limited public forum which it had not opened to religious uses.7"
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this reasoning.77 Justice
White reiterated that control, even over a nonpublic forum, may only be based
on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions are
reasonable in light of the forum's purpose and are viewpoint neutral.7" The
critical question is not whether the school treats all religious groups alike;
rather the question is whether Rule 7 discriminates on the basis of viewpoint
to "permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues and child-rearing except those dealing with the matter from a
religious standpoint."7 9 Clearly, films or lectures about child-rearing and
family values would have been allowed as a social or civic purpose under the
regulations, and the school denied the film's exhibition solely because it dealt
with the issue from a religious standpoint."0 Justice White stated this was a
clear example of a forbidden government regulation of speech that favors
some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others."' The principle applies
to all such cases, "provided that the defendants have no defense based on the
establishment clause."'

72. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
73. Id. at 2144-45.
74. Id.
75. 'Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 2147.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2147-48.
82. Id. at 2148 (quoting Judge Posner in May v. Evansville-Vanderbaugh Sch.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995
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Justice White acknowledged that Widmar v. Vincent' declared that a
state's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation "may be [a]
compelling" one justifying otherwise protected free speech under the First
Amendment.' However, in Widmar, the Court held that permitting use of
university property for religious purposes under an open access policy was not
incompatible with the Establishment Clause. 5
The Court reached the same conclusion when addressing Establishment
Clause concerns in Lamb 's Chapel. 6 Under the factual circumstances, "there
would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the
District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to
religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental."'
Justice White expressly endorsed use of the three-prong Lemon' test in
deciding Establishment Clause cases. The regulation did not violate the
Establishment Clause because (1) the governmental action had a secular
purpose; (2) it did not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion; and (3) it did not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion.90 Therefore, the state had no constitutional basis to abridge speech
and the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals.91
The Lamb's Chapel holding can be analogized to university
nondiscrimination clauses. Even if the university has created only a limited
public forum by making funds available to student organizations, it allows
discussion of issues pertaining to homosexuality by providing facilities and
funds to avowed homosexual groups. The university may control access

(which under Rosenbergerincludes funding) to this limited forum only if its
regulations are content neutral. If a university denies access to a group solely
because it discusses a topic discussed by secular groups from a religious
perspective, its regulations are not content neutral. Therefore, the abridgement
of free speech imposed by university nondiscrimination clauses violates the
First Amendment.

Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1114 (7th Cir. 1986)). The implicit assumption underlying this
principle is that a violation of the establishment clause is the only possible compelling
governmental interest in cases that are factually similar to May.
83. 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.
87. Id.
88. Lemon v.Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
89. Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct. at 2148.

90. Id.
91. Id. at 2148-49.
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Despite the clear result mandated by Lamb's Chapel, lower courts have
continued to deny student religious organizations funding despite First
Amendment allegations by the groups. Rosenbergerv. Rectors and Visitors
of University of Virginia' affirmed university action denying student funds
to Wide Awake Productions, a student magazine addressing issues from a
Christian viewpoint.' The denial was based on a guideline promulgated by
the Rector and Visitors forbidding expenditures on "religious activities."'94
The university defined "religious activities" in the guidelines as "an activity
which primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief(s) in or about a deity
or an ultimate reality.""5 Rosenberger and other students associated with
Wide Awake sued after the university refused to reimburse the group for the
first two issues of the magazine claiming a violation of their First Amendment
free speech rights.96
The court initially noted that denial of the benefit of a university-funded
grant contravened the First Amendment because it implicitly condemned the
content and viewpoint of Wide Awake's speech.' The result was that the
university created an uneven playing field which tilted towards student groups
engaged in wholly secular modes of expression." Thus, the court held that
the Rector and Visitors conditioned Wide Awake's receipt of government
benefits upon foregoing constitutionally protected rights of expression.99
Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals upheld the university's action by
finding a compelling governmental interest in not violating the Establishment
Clause.10 Notwithstanding the holding in Lamb's Chapel that access by
religious groups to school facilities did not violate the Establishment Clause,
the Fourth Circuit's application of the Lemon test led to its decision that
university funding would constitute such a violation."'
92. 18 F.3d 269 (4th Cir.), cert.granted,115 S. Ct. 417 (1994), rev'd,115 S. Ct.
2510 (1995).
93. Id. at 271-72. The stated purposes of Wide Awake were (1) "publishing a

magazine of philosophical and religious expression"; (2) "facilitating discussionwhich
fosters an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of Christianviewpoints"; and (3)

"providing a unifying focus for Christians of multicultural backgrounds." Id.
94. Id. at 271.
95. Id. at 271 n.2.
96. Id. at 273-74.
97. Id. at 279.
98. Id. at 281.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 287.
101. This decision was made despite the Rosenberger court's familiarity with
Lamb's Chapel. In fact, Lamb's Chapelwas cited in Rosenbergerforthe proposition
that the Lemon test remained viable in determining Establishment Clause challenges.

Presumably, the court only felt itself bound by the test itself rather than by the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1995

13

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 4 [1995], Art. 4

AMSSOURILAWREVIEW

[Vol. 60

The Fourth Circuit's Lemon analysis directly conflicted with that of the
Supreme Court in Widmar v. Vincent."° In Widmar, members of a student
religious group brought an action challenging exclusion from university
facilities generally available to other student groups."° The Supreme Court
held the exclusion violated the group's First Amendment rights to free speech
and rejected the university's defense that it had a compelling interest in
avoiding an Establishment Clause violation."'
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Widmar, discussed at great
length the second prong, whether the primary effect of the governmental
action will serve to inhibit or advance religion."°5 He noted religious groups
would benefit from use of university facilities."0 However, he stated the
Court previously explained that a religious organization's enjoyment of merely
"incidental" benefits did not violate the "primary advancement" of religion
prong." The group's benefit was incidental based predominately on two
factors. First, a university does not confer any imprimatur of state approval
on religious sects or practices by allowing access to university property."°8

"Such a policy 'would no more commit the University... to religious goals'
than it is 'now committed to the goals of the Students for a Democratic
Society, the Young Socialist Alliance, or any other group eligible to use its
facilities."" '
Second, the university made the forum available to a broad
class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers."
In the absence of
empirical evidence that religious groups would dominate the forum,
advancement of religion would not be the forum's "primary effect." ''
Justice Powell addressed Lemon's third prong, whether the regulation
would foster "excessive entanglement with religion," summarily by stating
that this prong had been "clearly met.""' In a footnote, he stated that the
university would risk greater "entanglement" by attempting to enforce its
exclusion of "religious worship" and "religious speech.""'

application thereof given by the unanimous Supreme Court.
102. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
103. Id. at 264-66.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 271-75.
106. Id. at 273.
107. Id. (citing Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Ad. at 275.
112. Id. at 271.
113. Id. at 272 n.11.
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The Fourth Circuit's analysis directly contravened Widmar. In finding
that a university policy allowing Wide Awake access to student funds
constitutes state action advancing religion, the court stated that it would be
difficult to view such an award "as anything but state sponsorship" of religious
belief."' Incredibly, despite the clear language in Widmar,"5 the court
made this statement without citing any authority." 6 Again, when evaluating
the third prong, the court ignored Justice Powell's analysis in Widmar."7
Although the court acknowledged that Widmar upheld direct nonmonetary
benefits to religions groups, the court stated (again without supporting
organizations and
authority) that "[d]irect monetary subsidization of religious
8
color."1"
different
entirely
an
of
beast
a
is
projects...
Predictably, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit in
Rosenberger."' Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted viewpoint
discrimination is the most egregious form of speech discrimination." The
goverment must abstain from regulating speech when the specific motivating
ideology or the opinion or perspective of the speaker is the rationale for the
restriction.'' By the very terms of the prohibition, the University did not
exclude religion as a subject matter, but selected for disfavored treatmentthose
student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints. 22 Thus, for
the University to prevail, it must meet the compelling governmental
interest/least restrictive means test.
In addressing the Establishment Clause concerns connected to the
funding, Justice Kennedy flatly stated, "[t]he governmental program here is
neutral toward religion."" The object of the Student Activity Fund, from
which the funding was to be derived, was to open a forum for speech. 24

114. Rosenberger,18 F.3d at 285.
115. See supra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
116. Rosenberger,18 F.3d at 285. This omission is more incredible in view of

Chief Judge Ervin's apparent admiration for Justice Powell. In the same paragraph,
Justice Powell is quoted in Hunt v. MoNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973), a case deciding an
Establishment Clause challenge based on a South Carolina bond issue excluding
sectarian colleges from state revenues. n fact, Justice Powell is quoted three times in
the opinion. Id. at 282, 285 and 286. Ironically, Widmar was not one of the opinions
Judge Ervin quoted.
117. See supranotes 105-113 and accompanying text.
118. Rosenberger,18 F.3d at 286.
119. 115 S. Ct. 2510, 2525 (1995).
120. Id. at 2516.
121. Id. at 2516.
122. Id. at 2517.
123. Id. at 2522.
124. Id.
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Rosenberger did not seek a subsidy because of his editorial viewpoint; he
sought funding as a student journal for its speech activities." s
Before addressing the final prong, Justice Kennedy noted the State's
neutrality was important in another respect. He said permitting the funding
respected the critical difference "between government speech endorsing
religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.""2 6 The
University had taken pains to dissociate itself from Rosenberger's private
speech so there was no real likelihood that the state either endorsed or coerced
the speech.1"
Finally, in addressing the separation of church and state principle, Justice
Kennedy ridiculed the dissent's suggestion that the university scrutinize the
content of student speech, lest the expression in question contain too great a
religious content."
Quite correctly, he noted that such scrutiny raises the
specter of governmental censorship-which is far more inconsistent with the
dictates of the Establishment Clause than is governmental provision of secular
printing services on a religion-blind basis."

Therefore, the Court held that the University had engaged in
impermissible viewpoint discrimination without a compelling governmental
interest and reversed the Fourth Circuit. 3 ° Although it took a Supreme
Court determination, freedom of speech triumphed in the end in this First
Amendment battle.
The irony of the First Amendment battles fought between religious
groups and homosexual groups regarding nondiscrimination clauses is that
homosexual groups have so recently been on the other side of the issue. The
Eighth Circuit accepted this proposition in Gay and Lesbian Students
Association v. Gohn.' In this case, the court held that the University of
Arkansas must provide funds to a registered student homosexual organization
in addition to access to university facilities when the university made funding
available to other organizations.'
The court stated that the university could
not deny funding for reasons which violated the group's First Amendment
Free Speech rights:
[The government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests-especially, his interest in

125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id.
Id. at 2522-23 (quoting Mergens, 110 S. Ct. at 2372).
Id. at 2523.
Id.at 2524.
Id.

130. Id. at 2525.
131. 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988).
132. Id.
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freedom of speech. For if the government could deny a benefit to a person
because of his constitutionally protected speech or associations, his exercise
of those freedoms would in effect be penalized and inhibited. This would
allow the33government to "produce a result which [it] could not command
directly."'

Freedom of speech is not "owned" by any social group; it belongs to
every American. Society must hear all viewpoints, religious and secular, in
order to progress. By permitting religious student organizations access to the
marketplace of ideas without forcing the groups to sell their identity, the
courts will help all Americans by promoting a free society where all opinions
are entitled to expression.
IV. FREEDOM OF AssOcIATION
Substantially related to the issue of freedom of speech is the issue of
freedom of association. Freedom of association is violated where the
government, by withholding rights or privileges, infringes upon the
communicative rights of a group."' Although the Constitution does not
explicitly mention freedom of association, the Supreme Court has always
protected this right because "[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to worship,
and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be
vigorously protected from interference by the State unless a correlative
engage in group effort toward those ends were not also
freedom to 35
guaranteed.'
Some confusion exists regarding the extent of freedom of association.
In fact, freedom of association is constitutionally protected in two senses.
First, in one line of decisions, the Court has protected the right of individuals
to choose to enter into and maintain intimate human relationships and has
secured these rights against undue interference from the State because these
relationships play a large role in safeguarding the individual freedom that is
central to our constitutional scheme.'36 In the other line of decisions, the
Court recognized a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in First
Amendment protected activities.137 The Constitution guarantees this type of
freedom of association as an indispensable means of preserving individual
liberties. 3

133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 366 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958)).
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
Id. at 622.
Id. at 617-618.

137. Id. at 618.
138. Id.
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Student religious groups, as well as student groups generally, will have
an extremely difficult time using the first type of freedom of association to
avoid university nondiscrimination clauses. This type of freedom of
association ordinarily relates to the creation and sustenance of a
Among other things, they are distinguished from other
family/marriage.'
relationships by relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to
begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects
of the relationships. 40
Campus groups do not share these attributes. Successful groups are not
small; in fact, one of the main goals of campus groups is to increase the size
of the group in order to increase the group's power. Notwithstanding the fact
that student religious groups will ordinarily require its members to accept the
basic tenets of its religion, they are not highly selective in their membership;
virtually anyone can join. Finally, campus groups do not shield the critical
aspects of the group relationship from others. Thus, student religious groups
cannot shield themselves from university nondiscrimination clauses under this
type of freedom of association.
However, student religious groups should be able to take advantage of the
"expressive" type of freedom of association. In fact, the Court has recognized
that according protection to a collective effort to pursue shared goals is
especially important in preserving political and cultural diversity and in
shielding dissident expression from suppression by the minority.141
The state infringes upon the expressive right of freedom of association
in three ways. First, the government may seek to impose penalties or
withhold benefits from individuals due to their membership in a disfavored
group; second, it may attempt to require disclosure of membership in a group
whose members seek anonymity; and third it may try to interfere with the
internal organization or affairs of the group.' 42 Although it appears that no
state actor has attempted to require disclosure of membership in student
religious groups, the use of university nondiscrimination clause can infringe
upon the expressive right of freedom of association. Such regulations impose
penalties on individuals holding certain viewpoints and interferes with the
group's internal organization.
This infringement occurred in Healy v. James4 3 where the State denied
benefits to individuals based on group membership. In this case student group
sought funding as a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

139. Id. at 619.
140. Id. at 620.
141. Id. at 622.
142. Id. at 622-623.
143. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
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at Central Connecticut State College (CCSC).'" Pursuant to procedures
designed by the school, the students filed a request for official recognition as
a campus organization and the Student Affairs Committee recommended it be
granted.' 45 However, the president of the college denied the students official
recognition and forbade them from using campus facilities to hold
meetings.'4 6 The Court held "[t]here can be no doubt that denial of official
recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges
[the] constitutional right" of expressive freedom of association.'47 The

Constitution's protection extends to indirect interference with fundamental
rights.' Thus, the possible ability of the group to exist outside the campus
community failed to ameliorate the impediment put in place by the President's
actions.' 49 In the words of Justice Brennan, "[w]e are not free to disregard
the practical realities. '
Additionally, the Court held that once a student group had filed an
application in conformity with the school's requirements, the school bears the
Further, the effect of
burden to justify its denial of official recognition.'
the denial constitutes a form of prior restraint; this requires the school to meet
a "heavy burden" in demonstrating the appropriateness of its action."'

Healy is a highly significant case for student groups of all kinds
attempting to avoid university nondiscrimination clauses. It explicitly states
that denial of recognition abridges the constitutional rights of the
It shifts the burden to the school to show why it imposed
membership.'
a prior restraint such as a denial of recognition on the basis of refusal to sign
a standard nondiscrimination clause.'
Nondiscrimination clauses are also problematic because they encroach
upon expressive freedom of association rights through interference with the
internal organization of a group. The Supreme Court dealt with this issue in

144. Id. at 171-72.
145. Id. at 172-74.
146. Id. at 174-76. In fact, a meeting held at a coffee shop on campus was

broken up on an order from the President. Additionally, nonrecognition deprived the
students from the opportunity to place announcements regarding meetings, rallies, or
other activities in the student newspaper. Id. at 176.

147. Id. at 181.
148. Id. at 183.
149. Id.
150. Id.

151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 184.
Id.
Id. at 181.
Id.
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Roberts v. United States Jaycees.' In Roberts, the Minnesota Department
of Human Rights attempted to force the United States Jaycees to admit women
into the organization.'
Prior to the lawsuit, regular membership was
limited to men between the ages of 18 and 35.157 The Court stated that the
Minnesota Act worked as an infringement upon the Jaycees' right to
expressive freedom of association by requiring the Jaycees to admit women
as full voting members.' 58 According to Justice Powell (writing for the
majority),
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure
or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the group to accept
members it does not desire. Such a regulation may impair the ability of the

original members
to express only those views that brought them
59
together
Therefore, freedom of association plainly presupposes a freedom not to
associate.Y °
Student religious groups can use Roberts in aiding their decision not to
sign university nondiscrimination clauses. Many religious groups fear that
admitting homosexuals will necessarily dilute the message portrayed by these
groups. Although religious groups ordinarily do not inquire into the sexuality
of their members, their fear that open homosexuality will impair the ability of
the original members to express their original views is a real one.'
For
this reason, Roberts is an important case for those seeking to preserve the
viewpoint of student religious groups.
Freedom of association, like all other First Amendment rights, is not
absolute. Just as one may not shout, "fire" in a crowded theater, one may
not use expressive freedom of association as a trump against all other rights.
Notwithstanding that, freedom of association is a well-protected constitutional
right. Infringements on that right may only be justified by regulations
"adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of
ideas, that cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

468 U.S. 609 (1984).
Id. at 614-16.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 623.
Id.
Id.
See, e.g., Haar,supranote 22, at 4 (comments of student Martin Baker that

accepting the amended nondiscrimination clause would be tantamount to declaring his
religious beliefs wrong).

162. Schenckv. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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associational freedoms.""16 Thus, the real issues are whether protecting
homosexuals from discrimination is a compelling state interest, and whether
forcing student religious groups to sign nondiscrimination clauses constitutes
the suppression of ideas.
At this date, the Supreme Court has not addressed whether protection of
homosexuals is a compelling state interest sufficient to justify state action in
substantially burdening the expressive right of freedom of association.
However, examining the relevant precedents clearly shows that protection of
homosexuals through the use of university nondiscrimination clauses is not a
compelling state interest.
The starting point for analysis is Bob Jones University v. United
States.' Bob Jones University denied admission to anyone involved in an
interracial marriage or anyone known to advocate interracial dating or
marriage.'65 In this case, the Supreme Court stated that the compelling state
interest in eradicating racial discrimination outweighed the right of the
university to free religious exercise. 66 In particular, the federal government
denied the university its tax exempt status due to its racially discriminatory
policies. 67
The Court relied on two principal factors. 6 First, the Court looked at
its own decisions concerning the constitutional status of racial discrimination
that "establish[es] beyond doubt th[e] Court's view that racial discrimination
in education violates a most fundamental national public policy, as well as the
rights of individuals."' 69 Second, the Court looked at legislative statements
which also spoke to the public policy against racial discrimination.'70 Based
upon these findings, as well as the invidiousness of racial discrimination, the

Court held the state interest sufficiently compelling to outweigh the burden
imposed by denial of tax benefits upon the university's right to free
exercise."
Similarly, in Roberts, the Court held that Minnesota had a compelling
interest in eradicating discrimination against women to justify the impact that
application of its statute might have on the Jaycees' right to freedom of

163. Id.
164. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
165. Id. at 580-81.
166. Id. at 604.
167. Id. These policies included a rule forbidding interracial dating by students
at the university with members of the community at large. Id. at 600.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 593.
170. Id. at 594.
171. Id. at 604.
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association." 2 On its face, the Minnesota Act did not aim at the suppression
of speech and did not distinguish between prohibited and permitted activity on
the basis of viewpoint." Instead, the Act reflects the State's commitment
to protecting the citizenry from serious social and personal harms resulting
from gender discrimination." The Court upheld the Minnesota Act due to
the compelling state interest in eliminating gender discrimination, as well as
the minimal effect allowing women into the Jaycees would have upon the
organization's message.'75
Despite these precedents, the Court is unlikely to find a compelling state
interest in prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals. The most
important case in the area is Bowers v. Hardwick,"6 which upheld a state
sodomy statute that criminalized private consensual homosexual
intercourse. 7 The Court found no fundamental right in the Constitution for
homosexuals to engage in consensual sodomy.'
This decision was based
outlawed sodomy. 179
states
50
all
1961,
until
that
fact
the
at least partly on
Against this background, the Court held that "to claim that a right to engage
in such conduct is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' is, at best, facetious."'80
Similarly, the Court refused to invalidate the statute on the ground that
no other rational basis for the law exists other than the presumed belief of the
majority that sodomy is immoral and unacceptable.'
However, Justice
White stated that law is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all
laws representing essentially moral choices were invalidated, the courts would

172. Id. at 623.

173. Id.
174. Id. at 624-25. Discrimination on this basis requires members of both sexes
to labor under stereotypical notions that often bear no relationship to their actual
abilities. Id. at 625.
175. Id. at 627-28. The Jaycees claimed that women might have a different

attitude about such issues as the federal budget, school prayer, voting rights, foreign
relations, etc, or that the organization's public positions would have a different effect
ifthe group were not a purely young men's association." The Court stated the Jaycees
were relying solely upon "unsupported" generalizations about the relative interests and

perspectives of men and women. Even if the generalizations were based on statistical
bases, the Court said this sort of analysis should be condemned when it comes to legal
decision-making.
176. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
177. Id. at 196.
178. Id. at 190-91.
179. Id. at 193.
180. Id. at 194.
181. Id. at 196.
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be exceedingly busy."
Thus, the Court did not invalidate Georgia's
criminalization of homosexual sodomy."
Many commentators have evaluated Bowers for a variety of reasons.
What can be taken from this decision with regard to student religious
organizations and university nondiscrimination clauses? One commentator
says two interrelated lessons can be drawn from this case as it relates to this
issue. First, the state may criminalize homosexual conduct."M If criminal
sanctions are in place, there is no justification for claiming a compelling
interest in ending private discrimination against those who engage in criminal
conduct. Therefore, the state's argument that it has a compelling interest in
eradicating private discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is much
more strained than it is with respect to discrimination based on race or
gender."
There is an additional reason to believe that eradicating private
discrimination against homosexuals is not a compelling state interest. As
stated previously, there is no general federal proscription of discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation."8 6 Despite concentrated efforts by many
homosexual rights activists, only a handful of states have prohibited private
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, often by statute rather than
through state constitutions."8 However, every state as well as the federal
government has made general proscriptions of private discrimination on other
bases including race, gender, and creed." Excluding sexual orientation
from the list of prohibited private discrimination surely weighs against
finding prohibition of discrimination against homosexuals a compelling
governmental interest.
Finally, the use of university nondiscrimination clauses differs from all
the aforementioned precedents in that these clauses are not "unrelated to the

182.
183.
184.
185.

Id.
Id.
Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 389.
Bainbridge, supra note 4, at 389.

186. Bainbridge, supranote 4, at 392. In fact, after concluding that prospects for

federal legislationremain dim, homosexualrights advocates are concentrating on state
and local issues. Id. at 392 n.8.
187. The distinction between statutory and constitutionalproscriptionis important

because the lack of constitutional protection has been held to indicate a
correspondingly lower level of state interest in eradicating the private discrimination;
while conversely, state constitutional guarantees of First Amendment freedoms have

been held to reflect a strong public policy in favor of these freedoms that outweighs
the state's statutorily created interest in eradicating private discrimination. Bainbridge,

supra note 4, at 392 n.109 (citing Smith v. Fair Empl. and Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 395, 409 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994)).
188. See supra notes 9-12.
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suppression of ideas." These clauses serve to suppress the idea held by
student religious groups, as well as other members of society, that
homosexuality is immoral. The aforementioned precedents dealt with
governmental rules indirectly infringing upon First Amendment rights;
nondiscrimination clauses do so directly. Even if the courts can somehow find
a compelling governmental interest, the infringement of rights would still be
unconstitutional because of the direct relation to the suppression of ideas.
To summarize, student religious groups' right to expressive freedom of
association is substantially burdened when universities deny official
recognition to the groups because they refuse to sign nondiscrimination
clauses. To justify this burden, the university must show a compelling
governmental interest, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, to prevail. The
only possible state interest, eradication of private discrimination against
homosexuals, almost certainly does not rise to the level of a compelling
interest, such as eradication of private racial or gender discrimination. Even
if the university can show a compelling interest, the means used by the
university relate to the suppression of the idea of moral equivalence between
homosexuality and heterosexuality. Therefore, the denial of official
recognition to student religious groups due to their failure to sign a
nondiscrimination clause is unconstitutional.
V. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
A. Would an Exemption Violate the Establishment Clause?
Religious student organizations contesting the amendednondiscrimination
clause seek at least an exemption from the university's general policy barring
discrimination against homosexual conduct if not the abolishment of the policy
altogether."8 9 The constitutional lines drawn by the Establishment Clause
on public university campuses with respect to student groups was the issue in
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia."' While
Rosenberger did not involve nondiscrimination regulations, the conclusions
reached by the Court make it clear that an exemption for religious groups (or
other groups with moral scruples against homosexual conduct) would not
violate the Establishment Clause.

189. See, e.g., Giles, supra note 24, at 3. This result would be the minimum
desired by student religious organizations. As stated in the beginning of this comment,

all groups, not just religious groups, have a claim under the Free Speech Clause that
their First Amendment rights are being violated. In that case, however, there were no
Establishment Clause concerns.

190. 115 S.Ct. 2510 (1995).
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In Rosenberger, the Court declared that the Establishment Clause
mandates an inquiry into "the purpose and object of the governmental action
in question and then into the practical details of the program's operation."''
The overarching principle is that the government must be neutral toward
religion." Although the Court did not label these inquiries as the test per
se, they do seem to be the criteria which, at least for now, have replaced the
much-criticized tripartite test of Lemon v. Kurtzman."9 It is hard to imagine
an argument claiming that a religious exemption establishes religion in a First
Amendment sense using these criteria. A religious exemption would give
religious groups equal access to the campus marketplace of ideas. The object
or purpose behind such an exemption would be to comply with the religions
liberties provided by the First Amendment and various legislative acts. 9 '
As far as the practical details of the programs operation, an exemption would
further the separation of church and state by limiting university regulation of
religious groups.
Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commission,' stated that "[t]his
Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must)
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the
Establishment Clause."' 96 The Supreme Court previously held that granting
a religious group an exemption from a religious antidiscrimination law does
not violate the Establishment Clause in Corporationof the PresidingBishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-DaySaints v. Amos.Y The Court
also held that an exemption from generally applicable tax laws did not violate
the Establishment Clause in Walz v. Tax Commission. 9

191. Id. at 2521.
192. Id.
193. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The total absence of any mention of the Lemon test
in Rosenbergerissurely a sign that it is has been rejected by a majority of the Court
and they have agreed for the time being to permit these criteria to be used instead of
another explicit test.

194. It might also "reflect the reality that student life in its many dimensions
includes the necessity of wide-ranging speech and inquiry and that student expression

is an integral part of the University's educational mission." Rosenberger,115 S. Ct.
at 2522.
195. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
196. Id. at 144-45 (citing Wisconsinv. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) and Walz v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970)).
197. 483 U.S. 327, 329 (1987) (exemption of religious group from religious
discrimination laws does not violate the Establishment Clause).

198. 397 U.S. 664, 676-79 (1970).

"The limits of permissible state

accommodation to religion are by no means co-extensive with the noninterference
mandated by the Free Exercise Clause." Id. at 673.
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Regardless of whether an exemption is granted, the actions of a university
religious organization may not be imputed to the university itself nor is the
government's imprimatur placed on the organizationbecausethe university has
chosen to confer recognized status to the group." Thus, there is no issue
of government speech which might violate the Establishment Clause in this
manner."' On the contrary, "official censorship" of politically incorrect
speechruns a far greaterrisk of violating the Establishment Clause and would
actually decrease the level of separation between church and state.2"'
Clearly, the Establishment Clause would not forbid a religious exemption from
regulations concerning discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.

B. Does the Establishment Clause Mandate an Exemption?
At first it seems counterintuitive that refusing to grant an exemption to
religious groups would violate a constitutional provision protecting against the
establishment of religion. However, several key Establishment Clause
principles may arise in this context. First, a public university may not
demonstrate hostility to a religious organization and its beliefs and
practices.2° The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment requires a
"benevolent neutrality" towards religion and religious organizations. 0 3
Second, government may not establish a religion of secularism. 0 4 Third,
government may not prefer one religion over another.0 5

199. As in Rosenberger,the "concern that [a religious organization's speech]
would be attributed to the University is not a plausible fear, and there is no real
likelihood that the speech in question is being either endorsed or coerced by the State."
Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2523. See also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274
(1980) ("an open forum in a public university does not confer any imprimatur of state
approval on religious sects or practices").
200. "It is no answer to say that the Establishment Clause tempers religious
speech. By its terms that Clause applies only to the words and acts of government.
It was never meant, and has never been read by this Court, to serve as an impediment
to purely private religious speech connected to the State only through its occurrence
in a public forum." Capitol Square Rev. and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S.Ct. 2440,
2449 (1995) (plurality opinion).
201. Rosenberger,115 S. Ct. at 2547.
202. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 18 (1947); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) (government cannot prefer those who do not
believe over those who do).
203. Walz v. Tax Cornm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) (citing Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334 (1987)).
204. Abington Township Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
205. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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This prescribes and proscribes certain behavior for public universities.
The separation of church and state protected by the Establishment Clause cuts
both ways. In this context, it prevents public universities from favoring one
religious group over another, such as by recognizing religious groups which
do not object to homosexual conduct and rejecting those who do. But, it also
prevents public universities from showing hostility to religious groups and
meddling in their affairs." 6
As stated in Everson v. Board of
Education,2"° the Establishment Clause "requires the state to be a neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers; it does not
require the state to be their adversary. State power
is no more to be used so
2 °8
them."
favor
to
is
it
than
religions,
as to handicap
Maintaining neutrality towards religion sometimes requires the
government to accommodate a religious organization. 2 9 Accommodation
may include an exemption for religious groups to a generally applicable law
or regulation. The strongest argument that the Establishment Clause mandates
an exemption is that the university is preferring one religious belief over
another.
VI. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
A. Background
"Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of

religion].."21' These words provide all Americans the right to worship as
their particular religion requires. The question in this context is whether the
free exercise rights of a university religious organization seeking official
recognition are infringed in a First Amendment sense when forced to agree to
a principle at odds with its religious beliefs."
Free exercise analysis is currently in a state of uncertainty. The Supreme
Court has historically applied a strict scrutiny analysis to any alleged

206. Id. at 15-16 (government may not "openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups"; a person may not be excluded from
receiving public welfare benefits because of their faith).
207. Id. at 17 (holding that inclusion of parochial school students in transportation
reimbursement program did not violate the Establishment Clause).
208. Id. at 18.
209. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987).
210. Free Exercise Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. I.
211. This comment will label the Free Exercise rights as those belonging to the
organization as a whole. Whether the free exercise claim properly belongs to the
group or to the individuals is only a semantic difference for the purposes of this
article.
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governmental infringement on one's exercise of religion." The historical
test used to determine whether the government violated the Free Exercise
Clause was premised on three prerequisites: 1) is a religion involved; 2) is it
a sincere religious belief; and 3) has the belief been substantially
burdened?213 Once this prima facia case was met, the burden of proof
shifted to the governmental body to show a "compelling interest" in regulating
the conduct in question and to use the "least restrictive means" possible to
satisfy that compelling interest.214 The government rarely overcame this
barrier.
Strict scrutiny replaced rational basis review, however, in the 1990 case
of Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith.2" 5 Smith held that a facially
neutral law of general applicability which incidentally effects one's exercise
of religion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause as long as it bears a
rational relationship to a legitimate governmental interest.2" 6
B. Analysis
The "compelling interest" test established by the Supreme Court to govern
free exercise claims stood for almost thirty years before being overturned in
Smith. In Sherbert v. Verner,a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church
challenged a state law which denied unemployment benefits to her after she
was fired from her job for refusing to work on Saturdays, her Sabbath.217
She refused several other jobs offers because they also required her to work
on Saturdays.2" 8 Because she turned down job offers, the law declared her
ineligible for unemployment benefits. 1 9
The Court found that this law clearly infringed upon her right to exercise
her religious beliefs.22 It stated that even an indirect impact on religion,
whether purposeful or not, violates the Free Exercise Clause.221 The Court
applied the highest level of scrutiny in order to protect religious freedoms.222
For a law transgressing one's religious beliefs to pass constitutional muster,

212. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsinv. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
213. Sherbert,374 U.S. at 402.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id.; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 213.
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
Id. at 886 n.3.
Sherbert,374 U.S. at 398-400.
Id. at 399-400.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 406.
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there must exist a compelling governmental interest which outweighs the right
invaded. 2' Employing this balancing test, it is possible for the government
to regulate a person's exercise of religion if society's interest in the law is
found to justify such an infringement.224
Wisconsin v. Yoder reinforced the holding in Sherbert.2' In Yoder,
members of the Amish faith challenged a state statute requiring mandatory
school attendance until the age of sixteen.226 The Amish religion forbids
parents from sending their children to public or private schools beyond the
eighth grade. 2'
Several Amish parents were convicted of violating the
statute.2" Consequently, they sought to enjoin the enforcement of this
statute claiming the law violated the Free Exercise Clause.229
The Court held that only "those interests of the highest order and those
not otherwise served" sufficiently outweigh the competing interests of the Free
Exercise Clause." ° The Court easily saw the conflict between the
compulsory-education law and the religious tenets of the Amish religion."3
The law left Amish parents with the choice of breaking the law, violating their
religious beliefs, or moving to a more tolerant state." 2
The Court stated that while beliefs can never be regulated by law,
religious practices can sometimes be subject to an overriding regulation by the
state in pursuance of the health, safety, and general welfare of the state or in
the exercise of the delegated powers of the federal government." 3 The

Court admitted this distinction but rejected the distinction between generally

applicable laws and those aimed directly at a religious practice." 4
Education is a primary part of the government's role in preparing citizens to
function in a democratic society and be self-sufficient in life." 5 However,
the state's interest in formal education beyond the eighth grade, the Court
held, was insufficient to justify the intrusion into the religious beliefs of the

223. Id.

224. Id. "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion." Yoder, 406
U.S. at 215.
225. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 235-36.
226. Id. at 207.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 208.
229. Id. at 205-09.
230. Id. at 215.
231. Id. at 218.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 220-21. ContraSmith, 494 U.S. at 872.
235. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 221.
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Amish. 6 The state did not satisfactorily establish that granting the Amish
an exemption would interfere with its interest in educating the children within
its borders 37
What appeared to be a well-entrenched rule of constitutional law was
suddenly overturned in the monumental case of Employment Division of
Oregon v. Smith.38 Smith radically changed the standard of review used to
evaluate free exercise claims3 9 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, set
forth the new test requiring any regulation, neutral on its face, incidentally
infringing on a person's religious practices, to be rationally related
to a
legitimate government interest.24 '
Smith involved two native American Indians who worked at a private
drug rehabilitation program in the state of Oregon. 241 As members of the
Native American Church, they ingested peyote as part of a religious
ceremony.242 Peyote is an hallucinogenic drug classified as a controlled
substance under Oregon law.243 Oregon law provides that the use of peyote
is a felony.244 Both men were fired from their jobs because of their
felonious use of the drug.245 They were then denied unemployment
compensation by the state of
Oregon because they had been "discharged for
' 246
work-related 'misconduct.' 1
The Smith Court distinguished between laws directed at a religious
practice and laws with an incidental effect on a religious practice, though
otherwise valid.2 47 The Court held that the former class clearly violated the
Free Exercise Clause, but placed prohibition of peyote in the latter class of
laws. 248 The Court declared that the government may apply an otherwise
valid law against a person with conflicting religious beliefs.249 The Court

236. Id. at 225.

237. Id. at 236.
238. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).

239. S. REP. No. 111, 103d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. V, § A (1993).
240. Smith, 494 U.S. at 878.
241. Id. at 874.
242. Id.

243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.

246.
247.
248.
249.

Id.
Id. at 877-78.
Id.
Id. at 878-79. See Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd.of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S.

586, 594-95 (1940) overruledby West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319

U.S. 624 (1943) and Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1879).
Exceptions to this principle involve hybrid cases, for example, see Smith, 494 U.S. at
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/4
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quoted United States v. Lee" ° to support its holding that the Free Exercise
Clause is not violated by a "valid and neutral law of general applicability on
the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion
,251
prescribes (or proscribes) ....
The Court should apply the balancing test from Sherbert only when the
case is a "hybrid," that is, a free exercise claim brought in conjunction with
another constitutionally protected right, such as speech. 2 While a "hybrid"
case allows the courts to apply the compelling interest test to free exercise
claims," 3 the majority of the laws challenged in such cases would be struck
down anyway due to the strict scrutiny applied to the other constitutional right
infringed upon. 4 As a result, Smith essentially renders the free exercise
clause a nullity-if it is combined with another claim, the Free Exercise
Clause analysis is likely unnecessary, and if it is not a hybrid case, rational
basis review is applied. As noted by the concurrence, an Equal Protection
Clause analysis would provide this level of review, regardless of the issue of
free exercise of religion. 5

C. Application to University Religious Groups
It is best to analyze the free exercise claims of a university religious
group under the SherbertlYoder test and the Smith test. Applying Smith
literally to the university regulations would render the SherbertlYoder analysis
applicable and not the rational basis test of Smith because of Justice Scalia's
"hybrid" exception and the presence of speech in this scenario. The presence
of speech, and not just religion, justifies strict scrutiny analysis. 6
However, the lesser scrutiny of Smith should be analyzed as well, due to the
uncertainty in the Court's free exercise jurisprudence.
University religious organizations being refused recognition due to their
refusal to sign the amended nondiscrimination clause should be able to take
advantage of the hybrid exception to obtain strict scrutiny review of the
university's regulation. As enunciated by Justice Scalia in Smith,

881-82.
250. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
251. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,263 n.3
(Stevens, J.,
concurring)).

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
Id.
Id. at 894 (O'Connor, L,concurring).
Id.
Id. at 881-82.
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"[t]he only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free

Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such
as freedom of speech... [a]nd it is easy to envision a case in which a
challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced
by Free Exercise Clause concerns." 7

As discussed in this comment university religious groups may claim
more than a violation of their free exercise rights-their free speech and
association rights are also infringed. If the hybrid exception is ever
applicable, this is the scenario. The Smith decision also left open the
possibility a court would apply Sherbert in some situations."
If Sherbert applied, the religious organization would have to show that
it is indeed a religious group and that its belief that homosexual conduct is
immoral or sinful is a sincerely held belief. Both of these requirements will
be met in almost every case involving a truly religious organization." 9 The
third prong, requiring a showing that the religious exercise has been burdened,
could be more difficult to meet. However, most religious organizations should
be able to show that being denied recognition on the basis of a university's
disagreement with one of its religious tenets constitutes a significant religious
burden. The university's denial of recognition is a denial of the right to
reserve university classrooms in which to hold meetings and the right to seek
student organization funds.26 In Sherbert, the Court held that conditioning

257. Id. (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07) (invalidating a
licensing systemfor religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator

had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious). See also
Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation
as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); and Follettv. McCormick, 321 U.S.
573 (1944) (same).
258. Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. Justice Scalia indicated that the fact that Smith
involved a criminal law was significant. He stated that "[e]ven if we were inclined to
breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployinent compensation field, we
would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminallaw."
Id. (emphasis added). A plausible argument exists that the Court, Justice Scalia
especially, intended to limit the reach of Smith to criminal laws.
259. The university may not require the religious organization to prove the truth
of any of its beliefs, including its views on homosexuality. Only the group's sincerity
with respect to these beliefs may be challenged. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78,

84-86 (1944).
260. The Court has stated:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct
proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of
conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
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the availability of benefits on a person's willingness to violate their religious
faith penalizes the free exercise of constitutional liberties.261
Once the religious group has met its burden, the university bears the
burden of proof to show a compelling government interest. The university's
interest is the struggle to fight discrimination against homosexuals and
bisexuals. However, the Supreme Court has held that sexual orientation is not
a suspect class deserving of strict scrutiny.262 This interest must be
compared to the right of the religious group to exercise its religious beliefs
and practices. The university must then show that this interest is so strong
that it outweighs other constitutional rights, or at least in this context is strong
enough to outweigh the benefits of a religious exemption.2 3
If Smith governed, the university would have a much stronger case. A
court would certainly characterize an outright prohibition of discrimination
applied to every recognized campus group as a neutral, generally applicable
law under the Smith analysis. Thus, the courts would be forced to conclude
that no burden exists on the religious group, it merely bears the incidental
impact of a neutral
law. If the Smith test applied, the university would
2
certainly V&. 64
VII. THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM RESTORATION ACT
A. Statutory Framework
Whatever the current status of the Free Exercise Clause, Congress
provided statutory law as an alternative to the Free Exercise Clause. In 1993,
Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)265

adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion
exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free
exercise is nonetheless substantial.

Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981), quoted by Hobbie v.
Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987).
261. Sherbert,370 U.S. at 410. The group's beliefs concerning homosexuality
need not be central to the group's beliefs, there may be dissent among the members,

and it may be a belief which is not also held by any hierarchical sponsoring body.
Thomas, 450 U.S. at 715-16.
262. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-92 (1986).
263. As discussedinthe section on associationrights, suprapurely secular groups
may also have a constitutional right infringed by such a university regulation.

264. The authors were unable to find a case where a religious group had won on
free exercise grounds when Smith was applied.
265. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb - 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993). While this comment was
being written, a district court judge declared RFRA an unconstitutional legislative

attempt to reverse a Supreme Court decision regarding the burden of proof under the
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to restore the strict scrutiny provided under Sherbert to all cases. RFRA
allows religious organizations to gain the protection for their religious
practices from burdensome university regulations without facing the barrier of
the Smith decision. 6 It prevents the government from indirectly coercing
a person's conscience contrary to their religious beliefs.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act is comprised of five sections. 6 7
The heart of the Act lies in the first two sections, which articulate the
purposes and define the coverage of RFRAs Congress included in

section 2000bb of the Act some basic historical findings regarding the Free
Exercise Clause and the context in which it arose.269 These findings
demonstrate Congress' support for pre-Smith case law and the compelling
government interest test.Y0 RFRA declares the compelling government
interest test to be "a workable test for striking sensible balances between
religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.""z l The Act
specifically declares that both neutral laws and laws with discriminatory intent
may burden the exercise of one's religion.272
The purpose of RFRA, as stated in section 2000bb(b)(1), is to return to
pre-Smith case law and, thus, restore the compelling government interest test
to free exercise claims.273 RFRA technically creates a separate and
independent statutory claim available to persons who feel that the government
is hindering their religious practices. 4 Due to its higher standard of
review, RFRA is a more favorable cause of action than the Free Exercise

First Amendment. Flores v. City of Boeme, 877 F. Supp. 355 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
266. For a more extensive analysis of a RFRA claim as it applies to the issues
discussed herein, see Bainbridge, supranote 4, at 369.
267. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb - 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
268. Id. § 2000bb and 2000bb-1. § 2000bb-1 reads in part:
(a) In general

Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, except as provided
in subsection (b) of this section.
(b) Exception.

Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only
if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is thb least restrictive means of furthering that compelling

269.
270.
271.
272.

governmental interest.
Id. § 2000bb(a)
Id.
Id. § 2000bb(a)(5).
Id. § 2000bb(a)(2).

273. Id. § 2000bb(b)(1).
274. Id. § 2000bb(b)(2).
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Clause for such persons. The Act applies to "all cases where free exercise of
religion is substantially burdened"' by any government actorY6 With
the availability of a claim under RFRA, the Free Exercise Clause should only
be relied upon when the claim involves a "hybrid" case as described in
Smith,277 though RFRA obviously applies to these claims as well.
Section 2000bb is a restatement of the compelling governmental interest
test.278 The teeth of the Act is its application to laws of general
applicability, thus departing from the rule in Smith. 9 Section 2000bb-l(c)
describes the judicial relief available. s° RFRA is available as a claim or a
While the available relief is not enumerated, the term
defense.2"'
"appropriate relief' gives the court discretion to determine the germane
remedy for the person whose religious exercise has been infringed.'n
Standing rules are governed by article III of the Constitution.2"
The last four sections tie up the loose ends. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was
amended to provide for an award of attorneys in a RFRA claim.2" Section
2000bb-2 supplies definitions important to the construction of the Act.'
Section 2000bb-3 states that the Act applies to both federal and state
governments, that it applies to all subsequently passed laws unless specifically
excluded, and that the Act does not authorize the government to burden

religious belief in any manner." 6 Finally, section 2000bb-4 declares that the
Act does not affect the Establishment Clause.2" It also seems to say that
denying a government benefit (or exemption) to a religious person or entity
because of their religious practices may violate RFRA.'
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

I-d. § 2000bb(b)(1).

Id. § 2000bb-3(a).
See supra note 252 and accompanying text.
§ 2000bb-l(a).
Id.
Id. § 2000bb-l(a) See supranote 249-251 and accompanying text.

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c), which states:

(c) Judicial relief

A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this
section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding
and obtain appropriate relief against a government. Standing to assert a claim
or defense under this section shall be governed by the general rules of standing
under article Ill of the Constitution.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id.

284.
285.
286.
287.
288.

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp.V 1993).
Id.
§ 2000bb-2.
Id.
§ 2000bb-3.
Id.
§ 2000bb-4.
Id.
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Congress has the power to expand constitutional rights under section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment." 9 Hence, RFRA is within the scope of
congressional powers even though the rights protected in this Act are
expressly within the bounds of the First Amendment.29 ° This provision only
authorizes Congress to expand rights. Congress clearly does not have the
power to restrict rights protected by the Constitution.
The essence of RFRA is that it restores strict scrutiny review to free
exercise claims.291 Practically, this difference in the level of scrutiny
employed by the courts
translates as the difference between probable success
292
and probable defeat.
Strict scrutiny is the highest level of review and requires that the means
which the regulation employs be the least restrictive means to accomplish the
end-a compelling government interest.2" This can be contrasted to rational
basis review, the lowest level of scrutiny. This standard requires that the
means employed by the regulation be rationally related to the end-a
294
legitimate government interest.
Smith distinguished between "neutral, generally applicable" laws which
have an incidental effect on a person's religious beliefs, and a "neutral,
generally applicable" law which also infringes upon another constitutionally
protected right.295 Thus, the Court will employ the compelling interest test
when a free exercise claim is brought in conjunction with a second claim that
would merit the compelling interest test on its own.296
RFRA would extend the compelling government interest test to all
situations "where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."2' 9 This

would not absolutely restrict the burdening of religious practices.29"

The

purpose of RFRA is to return to the case law of Sherbert and Yoder, which
289. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 5.
290. For a more complete discussion of this power, see Matt Pawa, Comment,
When the Supreme CourtRestrictsConstitutionalRights,Can CongressSave Us?, 141
U. PA. L. REv. 1029 (1993).
291. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1).
292. "It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interestwould suffice; inthis highly sensitive constitutionalarea, '[o]nly
the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
limitation."' Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406 (citation omitted).
293. E.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S.Ct.
2217, 2220 (1993).
294. E.g., City of Clebume, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center Inc., 473 U.S. 432,
448 (1985).
295. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
296. Id.
297. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (Supp. V 1993).
298. Smith, 494 U.S. at 894 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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struck a sensible
balance between "religious liberty and competing state
299
interests.11
Since the Court handed down the Smith decision, lower federal courts
have reversed many earlier decisions on free exercise claims.3" In Yang v.
Sturner, °1 the court stated its regret in applying the new standard set forth
in Smith."° This standard compelled the court to reverse an earlier opinion
which invalidated a law permitting the unauthorized performance of autopsies
under certain circumstances. 3" The petitioners were a Hmong couple whose
religious beliefs prohibited autopsies, which they viewed as a mutilation of the
body."
Because the law was neutral and facially valid, the incidental
impact on a minority religion was irrelevant." 5 In the court's earlier
decision under the strict scrutiny standard, it found that there was no
compelling state interest in mandating autopsies on persons whose religious
beliefs prohibit such actions. 6
The effects of Smith have indeed been far reaching. The court in St.
Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York9" allowed New York City to
designate a church as a landmark and to regulate any structural alterations to
the church building. 8 The commission placed in charge of this regulation
forbade the church to expand, finding that the landmarking law applied to old
buildings in general; thus, the church could not show the "necessaryhardship"
to receive certification to alter its own building, despite the growing needs of
its ministry.3°9 Under the Smith test, this facially neutral law constitutionally
authorized the city to tell a church what it could and could not do to its own
building. The Sherbert Court, and hence RFRA, would almost certainly
demand the opposite result. The balancing test mandated by RFRA would
require the court to weigh the city's interest in regulating the alteration of
historical buildings against the church's right to use its property to pursue the
needs of its ministry.

299. Id. at 902 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
300. When RFRAwas being passed, over 60 cases in the lower courts had relied

on Smith to override religious liberty. See 139 CONG. REc. S14,350-01 and S14,353
(daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).

301. 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
302. Id.

303. Id. See Yang v. Stumer, 728 F. Supp. 845, 846-47 (D.R.I. 1990), opinion
withdrawn, 750 F. Supp. 558 (D.R.I. 1990).
304. Sturner,750 F. Supp. at 558.
305. Id. at 559.
306. Sturner,728 F. Supp. at 856.
307. 914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990).
308. Id. at 351-52.
309. Id.
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In United States v. PhiladelphiaYearly Meeting of Religious Society of
310 the Internal Revenue Service levied against the salaries of two
Friends,
of the group's employees who had not paid part of their taxes due to a
religious belief forbidding them from paying the "military portion of their
taxes." '' The group refused to comply with the levy because of the group's
policy to not "coerce or violate the consciences" of its members." While
the group violated the law under Smith, the court refused to punish them
because the group reasonably believed that under Sherbert,the prevailing law
The court
at that time, they could successfully challenge the law. 3
criticized the decision in Smith and gave a strong indication that the balancing
test of Sherbert would produce a different result. 4
RFRA, however, may do more harm than good depending on how the
courts define the term "substantially." There are two possible constructions
of this term. It could be construed to simply mean more than de minimis. On
the other hand, courts could construe this term in its stronger sense to be a
new. balancing test where the court must determine the significance of the
burden on the person's religious exercise. Adoption of the latter view would
pose a serious long-term detriment to claimants under RFRA.
Assuming the courts adopt the latter construction, the term "substantially"
would establish a separate "hoop" to jump through for a person whose free
exercise rights have been violated. This new requirement would force the
courts to determine whether the burdened religious practice is central to the
person's faith. If this is the case, the Act would run afoul of constitutional
law. Courts may not weigh the "centrality" of a religious practice. 5
Courts cannot determine what the commandments of a person's faith are and
how important that belief is to that faith.316 As stated in Thomas v. Review
Board,IndianaEmployment Security Division, "religious beliefs need not be

acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit
310. 753 F. Supp. 1300, 1305-06 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
311. Id. at 1301.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 1305-06.
314. Id. at 1306.
315. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,474-476
(1988). The Court in Smith held that this would be the equivalent of weighing the
importance of the prohibited speech in a free speech case. Smith, 494 U.S. at 886-87.
See also supra note 259 and accompanying text.
316. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887. Under this construction of the term "substantially,"
courts may find themselves empowered to determine whether the claimed religion
actually requires, rather than prefers, the burdened religious practice. Such a result
would be disastrous to those whose religious faith requires very little, but who are
taught to live by convictions. Personal convictions may vary within a faith and will
thus be viewed, not as central tenets of a faith, but as philosophical preferences.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol60/iss4/4
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Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
First Amendment protection.
0317
interpretation.
When courts decipher two possible interpretations of a statute and one
would lead to an unconstitutional result, courts should adopt a "saving"
interpretation. 31" For this Act to retain its meaning and be consistent with
constitutional law, courts must interpret the word "substantially" to simply
mean more than de minimis. Such a construction is consistent with pre-Smith
case law. The Court in Sherbert stated that "[a] regulation neutral on its face
may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for
319
governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."
Yoder, without mentioning that an undue or substantial burden was required,
found that the rights of the Amish to exercise their religious beliefs
outweighed the government's interest in enforcing laws which accomplished
a compelling interest because their beliefs were deeply held (and thus
presumably of substance). 2 '

B. Applying RFRA to NondiscriminationClauses
As set forth above, RFRA is primarily a restoration of old free exercise
law. Applying strict scrutiny to the university regulations requiring religious
groups to sign a nondiscrimination clause contrary to their religious beliefs,
the regulation clearly cannot stand. A religious organization faced with such
a dilemma should raise a RFRA claim or defense in conjunction with a free
exercise claim.321
To uphold such a regulation, the university must demonstrate a
compelling governmental interest in including sexual orientation in the list of
protected classes. Precedent to date would make than an almost impossible
task.322 Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation is subject to
The Court has rejected suspect class status to
rational basis review."
homosexuals. 324 The university's interest in protecting homosexuals from

317. 450 U.S. 707,714-16 (1980). "Intrafaith differences ... are not uncommon
among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill
equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses." Id. at 715.
318. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937).
319. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)).
320. Id. at 216.
321. Until the Supreme Court rules onthe constitutionality of RFRA, itwould be
well-advised to raise both RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause and leave it to the court
to determine which claim to rule on.
322. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
323. Id. at 194.

324. Id.
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discrimination must give wayto the student's rights to speech, association, and
the free exercise of religious beliefs.
Assuming, arguendo, that a university could demonstrate a compelling
governmental interest in adding sexual orientation to the list of protected
classes, the university must then demonstrate that it is employing the least
restrictive means possible in achieving its interest. 25 At this point, the
religious group could claim that an exemption granted to objecting religious
organizations would be less restrictive. Since the university's interest in
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation would not trump
the rights of religious organizations, courts would have to find the university
regulation overbroad and force the university to narrow the scope of the
regulation.
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act will most likely prove to be a
-veryvaluable tool in upholding the rights of religious groups and individuals.
In the context of the university setting, RFRA provides both a shield and a
sword to religious organizations desiring to separate themselves from
government regulation.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

If all mankind, minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were
of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing
that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in
32 6
silencing mankind.
While some people advocate requiring student religious groups to sign
nondiscrimination statements with good intentions, the truth of the matter is
that this position damages the First Amendment rights of all Americans, not
just those with a religious perspective. John Stuart Mill's concept of liberty
is embodied by the terms of the First Amendment. Any infringement upon
the First Amendment actually constitutes an infringement on liberty.
Notwithstanding the fact that both Mill and the drafters of the
Constitution died long ago, the power of their ideas lives on in the American
legal process. Perhaps the most eloquent recent statement of this idea comes
from Justice Souter, who stated:
The very idea that a noncommercial speech restriction be used to produce
thoughts and statements acceptable to some groups, or indeed, all people,
grates on the First Amendment, for it amounts to nothing less than a

proposal to limit speech in the service of orthodox expression. The Speech
325. See supratext accompanying note 214.
326. JoHN STUART MILL, ON LmERTY AND OThmR WrrnGs 20 (Stefan Collini
ed., Cambridge University Press 1989) (1859).
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Clause has no more certain antithesis. While the law is free to promote all
sorts of conduct in place of harmful behavior, it is not free to interfere with

speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or
one, however enlightened either purpose may
discouraging a disfavored
327
strike the government.

The Supreme Court's analysis to date suggests that sexual orientation

cannot be a mandatory part of a nondiscrimination clause required for
recognition of university student organizations, especially those groups
espousing a religions belief precluding them from submitting to the
nondiscrimination clause. In the midst of the homosexual rights movement's
campaign for tolerance, it is ironic that they now advocate intolerance of a
contrary viewpoint and seek to prevent such a voice from being heard, even

if offensive. The university campus is the epitome of the "marketplace of
ideas" and the government should not be in the position of declaring which
viewpoint is worthy of being heard.
RICHARD M. PAUL 1H
DEREK ROSE

327. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 115
S. Ct. 2338 (1995).
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